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ARTICLE

Choosing Your Ground on the Endangered
Species Act: How Do the Ninth, Tenth, and
District of Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeal
Evaluate Water Management Decisions Made
by Federal Water Agencies?
MICHAEL KINSEY*
The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally,
but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces
of victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers, and
distances, constitutes the test of a great general. He who knows
these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into practice,
will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practices them,
will surely be defeated.
- Sun Tzu, “The Art of War”, ca. 450 B.C.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is, perhaps, overly dramatic to label litigation as a war,
waged with word-spears on the field of battle in a courtroom,
fought by modern-day knights dressed in ornate battle-garb.

* The author received his B.S. in Fisheries Science from Oregon State
University, and his J.D. from the University of Oregon School of Law. He is a
member of the Oregon Bar, and currently works in natural resources
management in the Pacific Northwest. The author would like to thank Professor
Adell Amos and the students of the Spring 2014 ‘Advanced Topics in Water Law
Writing Colloquium’, in which early drafts of this article were written. The
feedback and review of Professor Amos and the class were invaluable in those
drafts and the writing process.
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Overly dramatic, perhaps, but not necessarily inaccurate. If we
continue the metaphor, then the difficulties, dangers, and
distances within the courtroom, and the natural formation of the
country, the courtroom itself, are what the lawyer today must
master, lest he or she be defeated on the field.
Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
(Reclamation) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Army
Corps), operate a large number of water development and delivery
projects throughout the western United States. Agency managers
of the projects make operational decisions that govern how those
projects are implemented. These decisions are discretionary
actions subject to the requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the
Endangered Species Act (ESA).1 Agency implementation of the
ESA on water projects is often the target of litigation filed under
the ESA’s citizen suit provision.2
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, federal agencies
are responsible for the development and implementation of ESA
documents, and knowing what a court will look for and at when
that document is challenged can help the agencies to develop a
document that can better survive court review. Second, a plaintiff
who challenges such a document can benefit from that same
knowledge, by knowing which elements of the document to best
challenge. The intent of this article is to provide practitioners, both
agency and non-, with an introduction to that knowledge, to
identify some of those difficulties, dangers, and distances, with the
ultimate goal of adding clarity to an often confusing battlefield.
This article first provides, in Part II, an overview of how the
ESA applies to federal actions, and then discusses in Part III how
the Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuit Courts of
Appeal analyze, under the ESA, the decisions made by the federal
agencies. The discussion includes specific analytic tests the courts
have developed. Finally, in Part IV, the article describes a
hypothetical decision on a large river system with multiple dams

1. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012).
2. Id. § 1540(g).
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operated by Reclamation and the Army Corps as a hypothetical3
case study to illustrate the Courts’ tests.
Different federal circuits utilize different tests to determine
whether or not the decisions made under the ESA satisfy the
statute and court precedent. The intent of this article is to
illustrate the particular criteria some of the courts use in those
tests, and thus to provide information for federal agencies and
litigants to use in crafting their documents and, if necessary, their
arguments.
II. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The ESA has been called “the most comprehensive legislation
for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any
nation.”4 Part II discusses the application of the ESA to federal
actions. The heart of that application is the interagency
consultation requirements of section 7 of the ESA,5 but section 7
does not exist in a vacuum. To understand section 7, an
understanding of sections 4 and 9 of the ESA is first necessary. In
short, section 7 prohibits federal agencies from taking
discretionary actions which will jeopardize the existence of a
species listed under section 4, or which will destroy or adversely
modify its critical habitat.6 Critical habitat is ideally but not
always designated under section 4 when a species is listed,7 and
applies only to discretionary federal actions.8 In addition, all
persons, including federal agencies, are subject to the prohibitions
of section 9.9 This article provides a brief history of the ESA,
followed by a discussion of sections 4 and 9 before moving to section
7.

3. The hypothetical operating decision described in this paper is derived from
actual decisions made by federal water managers, but is not based on any specific
decision made by any specific agency.
4. Tenn. Valley Auth. (TVA) v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
6. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
7. Id. § 1533(a)(3)(A).
8. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
9. Id. § 1538(a)(1).
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Congress passed the Endangered Species Preservation Act
(ESPA, or 1966 Act), the forerunner to the ESA, in 1966, and
amended it in 1969 as the Endangered Species Conservation Act
(ESCA).10 The Department of the Interior issued the first listings
of species under the ESCA.11 Originally, the Department of the
Interior was responsible for implementation of the ESCA, but the
responsibilities were later split between the Secretaries of the
Interior (through the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, USFWS) and
Commerce (through the National Marine Fisheries Service NMFS,
now NOAA Fisheries) in 1970.12 The ESA itself, which repealed the
1966 Act,13 was passed by Congress, and signed into law by
President Nixon in 1973.14 Currently, the implementing
responsibilities of the ESA remain split between the two
Departments, with Commerce responsible for marine and
anadromous fish and most marine mammals and invertebrates,
and Interior responsible for terrestrial species and all birds.15 The
two Departments share responsibility for the ESA and its
application to sea turtles.16
A. Section 4
Section 4 is the first substantive step under the ESA to species
protection. Species are listed under section 4 of the ESA as

10. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., A HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
1973, at 1 http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/history_ESA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4DTS-HCVT].
11. See, e.g., 32 Fed. Reg. 3961, 4001 (Mar. 8, 1967).
12. U.S. Code, Title V, Appendix 1, Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970, 35
Fed. Reg. 194 (Oct. 6, 1970).
13. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 14, 87 Stat. 903
(1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544).
14. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
15. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1971), reprinted in 84
Stat. 2090-93 (1970), and in 35 Fed. Reg. 15627-30 (1970), and reprinted with
amendments in 5 U.S.C. app. At 1557-61 (1994).
16. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.,
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING DEFINING THE ROLES OF THE U.S. FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE AND THE NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE IN JOINT
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 AS TO MARINE TURTLES
(July 18, 1977), http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/species/turtle_mou.pdf [http://
perma.cc/CVK3-FCCN].
OF
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endangered17 or threatened.18 The Secretary (of Interior or
Commerce, depending on the species) may on his/her own initiative
begin the listing process.19 Alternatively, any person may petition
the Secretary to list a species.20 To the maximum extent
practicable, within ninety days after receiving such a petition the
Secretary must make a determination (a “90 day finding”)
“whether the petition presents substantial scientific or commercial
information indicating that the petitioned action may be
warranted.”21 If so, the Secretary must then commence a twelve
month status review, including requesting information from the
public about the species and its status, as well as threats to the
species.22 The USFWS has issued a policy to establish how they
will prioritize listing decisions.23
At the end of that twelve months, the Secretary must make
one of three possible findings: 1) that listing the species is not
warranted; 2) that listing the species is warranted, after which she
must publish in the Federal Register a proposed rule for the listing;
or 3) that the listing is warranted but precluded by other pending
listing proposals.24 In making her determinations, the Secretary
may only consider five factors: “A) the present or threatened
destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range; B)
overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or
educational purposes; C) disease or predation; D) the inadequacy
of existing regulatory mechanisms; or E) other natural or
manmade factors affecting its continued existence.”25
The Secretary is to consider the best scientific and commercial
data available, and to take into consideration any efforts by states
17. “In danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its
range.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).
18. “Likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future
throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” Id. § 1532(20).
19. Id. § 1533(a)(1).
20. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(A).
21. Id.
22. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B).
23. Methodology for Prioritizing Status Reviews and Accompanying 12Month Findings on Petitions for Listing Under the Endangered Species Act, 81
Fed. Reg. 49,248 (July 27, 2016).
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B).
25. Id. § 1533(a)(1).
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or foreign nations to protect the species.26 The Secretary may not
consider economic factors in the listing decision.27 The same
process is used to determine if a species that is currently listed
should be delisted or have its status changed.28 The listing process
is subject to the rule making requirements of the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA).29
Section 4 also governs the designation of critical habitat,30 and
like listing species is subject to the rule making requirements of
the APA.31 Critical habitat is
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the
species, at the time it is listed in accordance with the provisions of
section 1533 of this title, on which are found those physical or
biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species
and (II) which may require special management considerations or
protection; and (ii) specific areas outside the geographical area
occupied by the species at the time it is listed in accordance with
the provisions of section 1533 of this title, upon a determination
by the Secretary that such areas are essential for the conservation
of the species.32

The Secretary, in designating critical habitat, is to make the
decision based on “the best scientific data available and after
taking into consideration the economic impact, the impact on
national security, and any other relevant impact, of specifying any
particular area as critical habitat.”33 In making her decision, the
Secretary publishes with the proposed rule a draft economic
analysis of the rule, describing the economic effects of the proposed
designation.34

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
Act of Oct. 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–304, 96 Stat 1411 (1982).
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A).
Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 161 n.11 (1978).
16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A).
5 U.S.C. § 553.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A).
Id. § 1533(b)(2).
50 C.F.R. § 424.19(a) (2016).
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Finally, for purposes of this article, section 4 also governs the
development of recovery plans for listed species.35 Recovery plans
are “road maps” designed by the Secretary to guide the
conservation and survival of listed species, to the point where the
species is no longer in need of the ESA’s protections.36 “Recovery
goals must include: (1) “site-specific management actions . . .
necessary to achieve the plan’s goal for the conservation and
survival of the species,” (2) “objective, measurable criteria” that
would lead toward delisting, and (3) time and cost estimates “to
carry out those measures.” 37 “The Secretary must also provide the
opportunity for public notice and comment before final approval of
a recovery plan, and “prior to implementation of a new or revised
recovery plan, consider all information presented during the public
comment period.”38 Compliance with recovery plans is voluntary,39
but USFWS and NOAA Fisheries must consider the effects of a
proposed federal action on species recovery when writing biological
opinions.40
In sum, under section 4 of the ESA the USFWS and NOAA
Fisheries must identify species that are in danger of extinction or
that may become endangered, as well as the habitat that is critical
to their survival and recovery. In addition, section 4 requires the
agencies to develop road maps of specific actions and criteria that
will lead to the recovery of each species.
B. Section 9
Section 9 is the “prohibited acts” section of the ESA. It
applies to any person,41 a definition that includes
an individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association, or any
other private entity; or any officer, employee, agent, department,

35. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f).
36. Id.
37. Grand Canyon Tr. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 691 F.3d 1008, 1023
(9th Cir. 2012) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(B)).
38. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(f)(4)-(5)).
39. Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar, 691 F.3d 428, 432-33 (D.C. Cir. 2012);
Fund for Animals v. Rice, 85 F.3d. 535, 547 (11th Cir. 1996).
40. Grand Canyon Trust, 691 F.3d at 1023; see discussion of section 7, infra.
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1).
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or instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State,
municipality, or political subdivision of a State, or of any foreign
government; any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a
State; or any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.42

It prohibits the import, export, and taking of any endangered
fish or wildlife species within the U.S. or its territorial seas or any
threatened species protected by regulations issued under the ESA,
and the sale or shipping for interstate or foreign commerce.43 Take
is defined to mean “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such
conduct.”44 The USFWS has further defined, by regulation, ‘harm’
as “an act which actually kills or injures wildlife,” including by
habitat modification.45 ‘Harass’ is defined, also by regulation, as
“an intentional or negligent act or omission which creates the
likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as
to significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns.”46 The take
prohibition as it relates to habitat applies to all of the habitat that
a species relies on, but the destruction or adverse modification of
critical habitat applies only to federal actions and is separate from
the requirements of section 9.47 In contrast to fish and wildlife
species, listed plants may not be imported or exported, removed
from federal property, cut or dug up or damaged or destroyed in
knowing violation of any state law, or sold or shipped for interstate
or foreign commerce, but the ESA does not specifically prohibit
‘take’ of listed plants.48
Thus, in relevant part section 9 applies to federal agencies,
and prohibits those agencies from taking listed species, including
by damaging habitat those species rely on.

42. Id. § 1532(13).
43. Id. § 1538(a)(1).
44. Id. § 1532(19).
45. Babbitt, Sec’y of Interior, et al. v Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a
Great Or., et al., 515 U.S. 687, 691 (1995) (50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2016)).
46. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2016).
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
48. Id. § 1538(a)(2).
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C. Section 7
Section 7 of the ESA governs interagency (between federal
agencies) cooperation.49 Section 7(a)(2) requires each federal
agency to insure that any action (“all activities or programs of any
kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by
Federal agencies in the United States or upon the high seas”)50 it
authorizes, funds, or carries out does not jeopardize the existence
of a listed species or destroy or adversely modify designated critical
habitat.51 To jeopardize the existence of a species is to engage in an
action that would, directly or indirectly, be reasonably expected to
reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in
the wild, by reducing numbers, reproduction, or distribution of that
species.52 A similar definition in the regulations for adverse
modification of critical habitat was held to be invalid by several
courts.53 As a result of those opinions, the Secretaries by policy
disavowed the regulatory definition of adverse modification, and
used the intent of the statute to guide their interpretation of the
term.54 The Secretaries then promulgated a revised regulation
redefining adverse modification of critical habitat as a
direct or indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value
of critical habitat for the conservation of a listed species. Such
alterations may include, but are not limited to, those that alter the
physical or biological features essential to the conservation of a

49. Id. § 1536.
50. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2016).
51. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 158 (1997) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)).
52. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
53. Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059,
1069 (9th Cir. 2004); N.M. Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248
F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2001); Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245
F.3d 434, 441-42 (5th Cir. 2001).
54. See Memorandum from William T. Hogarth, Director, Nat’l Marine
Fisheries Serv., to the Reg’l Adm’rs, Office of Protected Res. (Nov. 7, 2005) (on file
with author) (on the application of the “Destruction or Adverse Modification”
Standard under Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act).
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species or that preclude or significantly delay development of such
features.55

There are limits to how far section 7 may go. The limit most
relevant to this article is that only discretionary federal actions are
subject to the section 7 process, while non-discretionary federal
actions are not.56 A complex federal action which is comprised of
multiple elements, some of which are discretionary and some are
not, is still subject to section 7 for the entirety of the action, for all
elements.57 A second limitation is that only affirmative acts are
subject to section 7.58 What triggers consultation is an agency
action, not the listing of a species by USFWS or NOAA Fisheries.59
An existing, ongoing action does not require consultation unless
one or more of four specific criteria (which are not relevant to this
article) are met.60
1.

The Section 7 Process

The section 7 process, or ‘consultation’, is reasonably
straightforward, at least in theory. The federal agency taking the
action, also called the ‘action agency’ must first determine whether
the action is discretionary.61 If it is, then the action agency
determines if the action may affect a listed species or designated
critical habitat.62 If not, because there are no listed species in the
action area63 or because the action is not one that will affect the

55. Interagency Cooperation – Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended;
Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification of Critical Habitat, 81 Fed. Reg.
7214 (February 11, 2016) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402.02).
56. Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. EPA, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007) (citing 50
C.F.R. § 402.03 (2016)).
57. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 928
(9th Cir. 2008).
58. Cal. Sportfishing Protection All. v. FERC, 472 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir.
2006).
59. Id. at 597.
60. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16.
61. Id. § 402.03.
62. Id. § 402.14(a).
63. Id. § 402.02 (an action area includes “all areas to be affected directly or
indirectly by the Federal action and not merely the immediate area involved in
the action”).
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species or the critical habitat, then no consultation is required and
the agency’s obligation is satisfied.64 If the action may affect a
species or critical habitat, then the action agency will prepare a
Biological Assessment (BA), the contents of which are at the
discretion of the action agency, and which evaluates the effects of
the proposed action on the listed species and designated critical
habitat.65 If the action agency determines that the action is not
likely to adversely affect the species, and the appropriate
regulatory agency concurs in writing, then the action agency’s
consultation requirements are complete.66 If, however, the action
is likely to adversely affect the species, then the regulatory agency
will prepare a biological opinion (BiOp).67
The BiOp is the opinion of the Secretary whether the proposed
federal action will jeopardize the existence of the species or destroy
or adversely modify the critical habitat.68 The BiOp must use the
“best commercial and scientific information available” in its
analysis,69 and will resolve ambiguities in favor of the species.70
Note however that the requirement to use the best commercial and
scientific information does not require the agencies to use the best
information possible, only the best information available.71 The
regulation also specifies that the BiOp is to be completed within
135 days unless the two agencies agree to a longer time72 although
no court has issued an order compelling the completion of a BiOp
because of violation of that time requirement.73 While the
consultation is ongoing, the action agency may not take any action

64. California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 575 F.3d 999, 1019 (9th
Cir. 2009); Defs. of Wildlife v. Flowers, 414 F.3d 1066, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2005).
65. 50 C.F.R. § 402.12.
66. Id. § 402.13.
67. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2012).
68. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
69. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(8).
70. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
71. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 602 (9th
Cir. 2014) (citing Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. Norton, 247 F.3d 1241, 1246 (D.C. Cir.
2001)).
72. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(e).
73. Courts have issued orders directing agencies to consult, and to complete
consultation under case-specific timelines, but none for violation of the statutory
timelines.
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that would have the effect of preventing the regulatory agency from
developing a reasonable and prudent alternative (see below).74
The BiOp is, as mentioned, the Secretary’s opinion. If the
Secretary finds that the action will not jeopardize the existence of
a listed species, or destroy or adversely modify critical habitat,
then the opinion will provide the rationale for that finding.75 If
otherwise, then the BiOp will include one or more Reasonable and
Prudent Alternatives (RPA), if any are available.76 An RPA is an
alternative to the proposed action that would not jeopardize a
species or adversely modify critical habitat,77 which is consistent
with the intended purpose of the action, is within the action
agency’s authority and jurisdiction, and is technologically and
economically feasible.78 The action agency should be involved in
the development of any RPA to be included in the BiOp.79
Whether the BiOp finds jeopardy or not, it will also include an
Incidental Take Statement (ITS).80 The ITS is a description of the
take that will occur from the proposed action but is incidental to
that action (is not the intent of the action), and will describe the
effects of the take on the species.81 The ITS must, to the extent
possible, precisely quantify the amount and extent of the take,
although USFWS and NOAA Fisheries have issued regulations
that allow the use of surrogates in an ITS when precise
quantification is not possible.82 When a surrogate is used in an ITS,
the ITS must describe

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

16 U.S.C. § 1536(d).
Id. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
Id.
Id.
50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2016).
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.,
ENDANGERED SPECIES CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, 4-43 (1998), https://www.fws.
gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/esa_section7_handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/3V
R4-EVTB].
80. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4).
81. Id.
82. Interagency Cooperation – Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended;
Incidental Take Statements, 80 Fed. Reg. 26,832 (May 11, 2015) (to be codified at
50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(7)).
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the causal link between the surrogate and the take of the listed
species, explain[s] why it is not practical to express the amount or
extent of anticipated take or to monitor take-related impacts in
terms of individuals of the listed species, and set[s] a clear
standard for determining when the level of anticipated take has
been exceeded.83

The ITS will also include those Reasonable and Prudent Measures
(RPMs) which will, in the opinion of the Secretary, minimize the
effect of the take on the species or critical habitat, along with
Terms and Conditions that implement the RPMs.84 The ITS, with
its attendant RPMs, functions as an exemption to the prohibitions
against take found in section 9; essentially, the ITS functions as a
permit.85 The RPMs are mandatory conditions of that permit, and
if not adhered to result in the exemption being no longer valid.86 In
the event an RPA is provided, the action agency has the choice of
whether or not to accept and implement the RPA.87 Once the
consultation process is complete, the action agency may implement
the action (or the RPA).88 Because the ESA does not specifically
prohibit the take of listed plants, no ITS is required for a proposed
action which harms such plants.89
In sum, when the action agency determines it intends to take
a discretionary action that may adversely affect a species listed or
critical habitat designated under section 4, it will initiate
consultation with the appropriate regulatory agency under section
7. The regulatory agency will respond with an opinion whether or
not the proposed action will jeopardize the existence of the species
or destroy or adversely modify its critical habitat. The opinion will
also include an ITS, which exempts the action agency from the
prohibitions of section 9, so long as the mandatory conditions of the
exemption are adhered to. The opinion may include an RPA, which
will avoid jeopardizing the species or destroying or adversely
83. Id.
84. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4); 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2016).
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o)(2); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 170 (1997).
86. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 170.
87. 50 C.F.R. § 402.15.
88. Id.
89. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 833 F.3d 1136
(9th Cir. 2016).
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modifying its critical habitat. Once the action agency decides what
action it will take, the section 7 consultation process is complete.
The section 7 process is simple and straightforward . . . on
paper. In reality, federal agency practitioners devote considerable
amounts of time, energy, and expertise to working through what is
truthfully a highly complex process. Federal agency biologists,
managers, and attorneys do not simply wave their hands, utter a
Potter-esque “Apparent documentum”90 and have the final BA and
BiOp arrive neatly on their computer screens. Instead, these
practitioners spend countless hours developing processes to
analyze the effects of proposed federal actions, and then countless
more conducting those analyses. The final BiOp is the result of
action and regulatory agencies analyzing, writing, reviewing,
reanalyzing, revising, reviewing again, and finally signing.91
Because these processes are so complex they frequently end up in
court as a means of challenging the underlying agency decision,
where the document’s survival or reversal/remand turns on how
well it meets that court’s test.
III. THE ANALYTIC TESTS OF THE NINTH, TENTH,
AND D.C. CIRCUITS
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has come the closest to
articulating a specific test for evaluating the adequacy of a BiOp.
In part, this is likely the result simply of the Ninth Circuit hearing
more ESA cases related to BiOps. The D.C. Circuit has not
articulated a specific test at all. This, likely, is because the D.C.
Circuit is the more typical venue for legal challenges related to
listing decisions, critical habitat designations, and recovery plans,
instead of challenges to actions taken as a result of those decisions.
The Tenth Circuit is somewhere in the middle in regards to its
development of a test, having developed one but less clearly than
the Ninth Circuit. In addition, the three Circuits selected for this
article’s analysis have very different approaches to environmental

90. Latin for “Document appear.”
91. See, e.g., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., AN ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK FOR
CONDUCTING JEOPARDY ANALYSES UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT (2004), http://www.fpir.noaa.gov/Library/PRD/ESA%20Consultation/NMFS
%202004%20-%20Analytical%20Framework-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MJ5S-WJ
FL].
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review. The Ninth Circuit historically is generally sympathetic to
challenges to agency decisions under environmental statutes, the
Tenth Circuit less so, and the D.C. Circuit somewhere in the
middle. Regardless, this section describes the Ninth Circuit’s ‘test’,
and that of the Tenth and D.C. Circuits to the extent one can be
identified. All challenges to the adequacy of a BiOp are evaluated,
regardless of Circuit, under the familiar arbitrary and capricious
standard of section 706 of the APA.92 Any piece of the BiOp which
can be found to be in violation of that standard, regardless of
whether it is part of an express test or not, will likely cause the
court to strike down the BiOp and remand it back to the regulatory
agency for revision.93
A. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit has never explicitly stated its analytic test
or tests for determining whether a BiOp and the underlying agency
action are compliant with the ESA. Two cases, however, are
instructive.
The first is Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service.94 The relevant holding from this case, that the definition
promulgated in regulation by NOAA Fisheries and the USFWS for
destroying or adversely modifying critical habitat is invalid,
followed the holdings in two prior cases from the Fifth and Tenth
Circuits.95 The Court found that the definition in the regulations
“reads the ‘recovery’ goal out of the adverse modification inquiry; a
proposed action ‘adversely modifies’ critical habitat if, and only if,
the value of the critical habitat for survival is appreciably
diminished.” (emphasis in original).96 The court followed the two

92. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 174 (1997).
93. See, e.g., Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509 F.3d 1310, 1320 (10th
Cir. 2007); Oceana, Inc. v Gutierrez, 488 F.3d 1020, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Ariz.
Cattle Grower’s Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Bureau of Land Mgmt., 273
F.3d 1229, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 2001).
94. Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059
(9th Cir. 2004).
95. N.M. Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277,
1283 n.2 (10th Cir. 2001); Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434,
441-42 (5th Cir. 2001).
96. Gifford Pinchot, 378 F.3d at 1069.
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prior Circuits in striking down the regulation, and held that the
statutory language of the ESA stated that “destruction or adverse
modification could occur when sufficient critical habitat is lost so
as to threaten a species’ recovery even if there remains sufficient
critical habitat for the species’ survival.”97 In essence, the court
held that the regulatory agencies could not limit their adverse
modification analysis, but instead that adverse modification could
be found where the value of the habitat is appreciably diminished
for the survival or the recovery of the species.
The agencies’ regulations were, in the opinion of the courts,
placing an unwarranted restriction on the statutory text. The
recovery of a species, to the point it no longer needs the protections
of the ESA, is a much higher standard than mere survival, but the
then regulatory definition made no distinction between the two.
The agencies were thus prevented from finding adverse
modification of the critical habitat where the federal action merely
left enough of the habitat for the species to persist. Accordingly, an
evaluation of the value of the habitat for survival or recovery is the
first piece of the test the Ninth Circuit will bring to bear in its
analysis. The holding from this case, still good law, was the final
genesis of the regulatory agencies’ efforts to revise the definition of
adverse modification of critical habitat described earlier, and the
revised definition was specifically crafted to reflect the holding of
this line of cases.98
A second case from the Ninth Circuit, National Wildlife
Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 99 is more recent,
and one in which the court further articulated elements of its
analytic approach.
In this case, one in a long line of challenges, environmental
groups challenged the BiOp written by NOAA Fisheries (then
NMFS) for the Federal Columbia River Power System dams and
related facilities.100 The court first held that the regulatory agency
97. Id. at 1070.
98. Interagency Cooperation – Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended;
Incidental Take Statements. 80 Fed. Reg. 26,832 (May 11, 2015) (to be codified at
50 C.F.R. pt. 402.14(g)(7)).
99. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917 (9th
Cir. 2008).
100. Id.
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had to evaluate the effects of the federal action on the
environmental baseline,101 which includes “the context of other
existing human activities that impact the listed species.”102 For
example, the existence of dams on a river system which are already
endangering listed species is one facet of that context within the
environmental baseline. The proposed federal action must be
evaluated within that baseline.103 Part of this analysis is
identifying what pieces of the action are discretionary and which
ones are not, while evaluating the entirety of the action against
that baseline.104 Identifying correctly what is properly in the
environmental baseline is thus another element of the court’s
analytic test.
The Ninth Circuit has also held that the regulatory agencies
must “consider the near term habitat effects to populations with
short life cycles.”105 To appropriately consider this, the regulatory
agency must assess the effects of the action over time, especially
when evaluating those effects over the life span of the species.106
The BiOp thus cannot look only at the long term or the short term
effects, but must look at both.
A fourth element the Circuit has articulated is the ability of
the action agency and the regulatory agency to definitively identify
future actions, either as part of the baseline or as mitigation, for
their analyses. The action agency must have a clear commitment
and ability to implement the specified future actions before the
regulatory agency can correctly include them in the analysis.107 A
general intention to implement some actions intended to benefit

101. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2012). The environmental baseline is, essentially,
the current conditions of the action area in addition to the anticipated effects of
federal actions which have already undergone section 7 consultation. It is what
the effects of the proposed action are measured on.
102. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 524 F.3d at 930.
103. Id. at 930-31.
104. Id. at 928.
105. Id. at 934 (citing Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005)).
106. Pac. Coast Fed’n, 426 F.3d at 1094.
107. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 524 F.3d at 935-36 (“. . . [W]e are not persuaded
that even a sincere general commitment to future improvements may be included
in the proposed action in order to offset its certain immediate negative effects,
absent specific and binding plans.”).
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listed species is not definitive enough to be included in the analysis
or relied on in it.108 When the action agency has the desire but lacks
the power or authority to reasonably guarantee that the desired
actions will be implemented, the regulatory agency must “exclude
them from the analysis and consider only those actions that are
reasonably certain to occur.”109 Thus, the project description must
be accurate, complete, and within the power of the action agency
to implement.
Finally, the court has identified one last element. For the BiOp
to have a valid analysis, the regulatory agency must have some
idea of at what point the existence of that listed species will
actually be in jeopardy.110 It is not enough for the regulatory
agency to suspect that a species will be jeopardized, the agency
must have a basis in science and the law to sustain the jeopardy
determination.111 When habitat is already degraded the regulatory
agency should logically “know roughly at what point survival and
recovery will be placed at risk before it may conclude that no harm
will result from ‘significant’ impairments to habitat.”112 Thus, the
regulatory agency cannot assert without reason that the proposed
federal action will or will not violate section 7(a)(2), it must have a
basis to support its opinion based on knowledge of the “tipping
point” of the species.
Ultimately, then, the Ninth Circuit’s analytic test, as derived
from the discussion above, tests the following points:
1) an evaluation of the value of the habitat for survival or
recovery;
2) an identification of what is properly in the environmental
baseline;
3) an analysis of both the long term and the short term
effects;
4) a project description which is accurate, complete, and
within the power of the action agency to implement; and

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id. at 936 n.17.
Id. at 936.
Id.
Id.
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5) a scientific basis by the regulatory agency of at what
point the existence of the listed species will actually be in
jeopardy.
B. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit has not articulated an especially clear
analytic test for evaluating the adequacy of a BiOp. The court has,
however, articulated several points that can be assembled into
such a test.
The first point is that the BiOp’s evaluation of the effects of
the proposed action must include a consideration of the action on
the species recovery.113 The court in Cables articulated a rationale
similar to that of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in NWF, although
phrased differently.114 In Cables, environmental groups challenged
the U.S. Forest Service and the USFWS related to grazing in areas
designated as critical habitat for the Preble’s meadow jumping
mouse, specifically including the BiOp for the action.115 The court
interpreted the definitions within the ESA to establish that the
purpose of critical habitat is to identify habitat with characteristics
essential to the conservation of the species.116 Conservation was
then identified by the court, again based on the statutory text, as
encompassing recovery.117 The court then concluded that critical
habitat is adversely modified when the federal action adversely
affects a species recovery.118 Accordingly, a valid BiOp will consider
the effects of the proposed federal action on the recovery of the
species.

113. Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509 F.3d 1310, 1322 (10th Cir.
2007).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1312-13.
116. Id. at 1321-22 (“Thus, critical habitat is impaired when features
essential to the species’ conservation are impaired.”); see also N.M. Cattle
Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 1281 (10th Cir. 2001)
(“Our primary task in construing statutes is to ‘determine congressional intent,
using traditional tools of statutory interpretation.’ ‘As in all cases requiring
statutory construction, we begin with the plain language of the law.’”) (internal
citations omitted).
117. Cables, 509 F.3d at 1321.
118. Id.
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The Tenth Circuit has also identified the information relied on
in the BiOp to be of importance. As noted above, the ESA requires
a BiOp to use the “best scientific and commercial information
available.”119 The court has not interpreted this requirement as a
mandate that the action agency or the regulatory agency collect
new data.120 Instead, the agencies must determine what existing
data are the “most accurate, reliable, and relevant,” and are good
science.121 The court noted that reliable, peer-reviewed, and
scientifically valid methods are the standard against which this
element should be measured.122
Finally, courts within the Tenth Circuit have identified a
requirement for a clear and definite commitment to implementing
actions intended to benefit listed species, essentially mitigating the
effects of the proposed action.123 This requirement parallels the
Ninth Circuit’s similar element, and in fact the courts cited the
Ninth Circuit in identifying and relying on it.124
Accordingly, courts within the Tenth Circuit will likely rely on
these three elements in evaluating the adequacy of a BiOp:
1) an evaluation of the effects of the proposed action on the
species recovery;
2) the use of valid, peer-reviewed scientific data; and
3) a definite commitment to implementing each piece of the
proposed action before evaluating it.
C. The D.C. Circuit
The D.C. Circuit has also not articulated any specific test for
evaluating a BiOp, other than the standards of the APA.

119. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).
120. Ecology Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1183, 1195 n.4 (10th Cir.
2006).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Town of Superior v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 913 F. Supp. 2d 1087,
1140 (D. Col. 2012).
124. Id. (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d
917, 935-36 (9th Cir. 2008)).
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Accordingly, the arbitrary and capricious standard125 is the only
universal test within the Circuit.126
IV. THE HYPOTHETICAL OPERATING DECISION
A. Introduction
Like the section 7 process generally, as noted above, the tests
by which the courts evaluate BiOps are simple and
straightforward . . . on paper. The reality is, again, rather more
complex. Federal agencies, which each have their own missions,
their own statutorily driven requirements for action, and which are
faced with increasing demands for more action in an era of
shrinking resources, continually struggle with the question of what
needs to be in a BA and a BiOp versus what should be there versus
what can be there. Nowhere is this struggle more widespread,
complex, and fraught with litigation and litigation risk than in
consultations on complex actions on large river systems in the
American West. The reader is invited to peruse the countless law
review articles discussing lawsuits, and their underlying causes,
related to the ESA and major river systems such as the
Sacramento and San Joaquin, Columbia, Rio Grande, and
Colorado, to name a mere few.
This paper describes a hypothetical operational decision,
including the hypothetical (and very superficial) environmental
baseline, and then applies the tests identified by the three Circuit
Courts of Appeal described above.127 The section 7 consultation is
125. Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007)
(citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (in which the agency “relied on factors which Congress had not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference
in view or the product of agency expertise”).
126. It is, however, worth noting that in at least one case, the court has
bserved with approval the detailed and specific nature of an RPA within a BiOp.
See Oceana v. Gutierrez, 488 F.3d 1020, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
127. The operational decision described here is entirely hypothetical, and
has been created in this paper for the sole purpose of providing a basis to apply
the tests. It is not intended to represent what actually happens on the ground, it
is simply an aid to demonstrate how the tests might be applied.
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also entirely hypothetical. Although it appears complex, the
decision described here is extremely simplistic in comparison to a
real decision on a system like this. Some elements of the decision
have been inspired by federal actions, but the decision described
here is not based on any single decision by any federal agency. In
addition, none of the details of the decision described here are
guaranteed to be exactly what a federal agency might actually
decide to do. Operational decisions are based on a vast array of
factors that are well beyond the scope of this paper to describe
precisely and comprehensively. Finally, this paper assumes that
any appeal to the Endangered Species Committee128 is not a viable
option.
B. The Hypothetical Operations Decision
1.

The Operations

The Audubon River (the River) is a major river system that
flows for nearly 600 miles, from its headwaters in the ruggedly
iconic Sans Pitié Mountains, across and through three states, to its
confluence with the Pacific Ocean. The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
(Reclamation) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps)
both operate multiple dams on the River and its tributaries, for
water storage and delivery, flood control, and hydropower
generation purposes. Each dam is a complete barrier to fish
passage up or down the stream, barring some sort of additional
passage facility, which some but not all dams have. Each dam has
a specific Congressional authorization describing the facility’s
purposes and function, but which leaves operational decisions to
the discretion of the managing agency. There are a total of 29
federal dams on the system. Of those, 14 are primarily hydropower
generating, 10 are water storage and delivery based, and 5 are for

128. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)-(h) (2012). The Endangered Species Committee,
sometimes popularly referred to as the “God Squad,” is a Cabinet level committee
comprised of seven specific individual members, plus one member from each
affected state, appointed by the President. Id. A federal agency, the governor of
the state in which the action may occur, or a permit or license applicant, may
request the Secretary of the Interior to convene the Committee if a jeopardy BiOp
has been issued for the action. Id. The Secretary is not required to grant that
request. Id. The Committee may (but, again, is not required to), after following
specific procedures, grant an exemption from the section 7 requirement. Id.
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flood control. Each dam, regardless of purpose, has some ability to
provide for flood control in emergencies. There are no state or
privately owned dams on the system.
The federal agencies operating the facilities on the system
coordinate their operations with each other, pursuant to a
Coordinated Operating Agreement (COA). The current COA is 25
years old, and the agencies are proposing to issue a new COA that
accounts for the new and projected future conditions in the system.
The new COA’s terms are outlined in detail in the agreement itself,
and are summarized in relevant part here:
• Term: the COA is proposed to extend for a 25 year period;
• Hydropower dams will pass specific flows through their
facilities, depending on the time of year, precipitation
conditions in the system, and customers’ power needs;
• Water storage/delivery dams will capture and store
rainfall and snow melt runoff, then either pump the
stored water out of the system to the agency’s contracted
customers, or release it through the facilities back into the
system. The amounts diverted and released are
dependent on contractual obligations and the amount of
water available for delivery (the timing of each is
dependent on the time of year), and water rights
obligations pursuant to state water law. The COA
acknowledges that the timing may change, depending on
the ongoing effects of climate change on precipitation
patterns;
• Flood control dams will operate on a ‘pass through’
schedule for most of the year, in which the amount of
water released through the facilities will be the same as
the amount of water flowing into the reservoir created by
the dam. When heavy rain or snow fall or runoff is
anticipated, however, the dams will release enough water
to safely store the projected incoming water, based on
predicted recession curves which are revised annually;
• The Corps retains the authority to declare a flood
emergency in all or part of the system, and to direct
specific flow rates and storage in any facility when
necessary to protect life or property. The COA
acknowledges this authority, but cannot predict the
precise conditions under which it will be exercised;
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Five
mainstem
dams,
pending
Congressional
appropriation and authorization, will design and
implement fish passage structures which will allow
unimpeded volitional passage for up and down stream
movement of fish. Flow through these passage structures
will be provided at the appropriate times of year, subject
to an upper limit of total amount of water released
through each;
An array of ‘mitigation measures’ will be implemented
throughout the system. Some measures are specifically
identified with descriptions and timing, others are left
indeterminate over the life of the COA;
The COA has predicted how much water will likely be
available in the system as a whole and in each facility on
an annual basis, depending on the type of water year for
the current and three prior years. The calculations
involved are extraordinarily complex and require
considerable scientific and engineering expertise to
understand and implement; and
In addition to the other uses in the system, based on those
same calculations, the COA has identified a specific
amount of water across the system which will be used to
provide ‘benefits’ to the listed species on an adaptive
management basis. Each agency has named three people
(one senior management, one operations specialist (an
engineer), and one biologist) to a Benefits Team (BT),
which can use the water to enhance migration flows,
provide additional spawning flow, buffer higher summer
temperatures, or any other use the BT determines will
benefit one or more species. The COA leaves to the BT the
decisions on how to identify those benefits. The COA has
roughly allocated about one third of the amount of water
to each of three management areas (upper, middle, and
lower) within the system.
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The Species and Habitat

The system is home to multiple species listed as threatened or
endangered under the ESA. Four listed anadromous129 fish species
use the system for spawning, rearing, and migration; critical
habitat in the system has been designated for three of those
species. Three listed non-anadromous fish species use the River for
their entire life cycle; critical habitat in the system has been
designated for each. Five listed species of birds use the River for
hunting and feeding, two of which typically nest within 300 yards
of the water’s edge; critical habitat has been designated for only
one bird species. One listed mollusk species lives in a single area
within one tributary, a short distance downstream of a water
storage/delivery dam, and is found nowhere else in the world. All
of these species are listed under the ESA, and other than the
mollusk all use the entire system to varying degrees. There is a
vast diversity of other fish, wildlife, and plants that use the system
for one or more portions of their life cycle, in addition to the listed
species. Two of the anadromous fish species and one of the bird
species have final recovery plans in place.
C. The Section 7 Consultation
Reclamation and the Army Corps determined that the
proposed COA would adversely affect all of the listed species except
for the non-anadromous fish species, which would be unaffected by
the COA. The agencies then jointly prepared and submitted a BA
to USFWS (for the birds and the mollusk) and NOAA Fisheries (for
the anadromous fish). USFWS did not agree with the
determination on the non-anadromous fish and strongly urged the
action agencies to include the species in the consultation.
Reclamation and the Army Corps declined to revise their
determination, and on the advice of counsel USFWS did not
address those species in the final BiOp.

129. Anadromous fish are born in fresh water, rear in fresh water for some
period of time, out-migrate to the ocean to continue growing, and then return to
fresh water to spawn. Marine and Anadromous Fish, NOAA FISHERIES (June 29,
2016), http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/species/fish [https://perma.cc/42CR-LL8M].
Some species die after spawning (Semelparity, CAMPBELL BIOLOGY (J. B. Reece et
al. eds., 10th ed. 2011), others return to the ocean to continue their life cycle
(Iteroparity, Id.).
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Being cognizant of the risk of issuing mutually incompatible
BiOps, USFWS and NOAA Fisheries jointly prepared and issued a
BiOp. In the BiOp, USFWS determined that the COA would
jeopardize the existence of the mollusk, but would not jeopardize
the existence of the birds. The COA would also not destroy or
adversely modify the designated critical habitat for the bird. NOAA
Fisheries determined that the proposed COA would jeopardize the
existence of all four anadromous fish, and would adversely modify
the designated critical habitats.
In reaching these determinations, the regulatory agencies
relied on a considerable body of peer-reviewed scientific literature
on the status of the species within the River system, as well as
historic operating patterns of all the dams. They relied in addition
on information from monitoring reports compiled by Reclamation
and the Army Corps, on projected changes to hydrologic patterns
related to climate change, and on casual observations made by
observers along the River. The agencies specifically incorporated
discussion of the recovery plans (for those species that had them)
into the BiOp, and used those plans as a significant part of their
analysis for the effects on species recovery. The agencies assumed
that all of the mitigation measures would be implemented in full
over the course of 25 years, and that the five dams would all have
full Congressional appropriation and authorization for passage
structures within the next five years. The agencies assessed the
effects of the COA on the listed species, on the designated critical
habitat, and on the ability of the listed species in the River system
to recover over the 25 year COA lifetime. Finally, the agencies
assumed that the actions of the BT would provide unquantified
benefits to listed species over the lifetime of the COA.
The agencies also developed a draft RPA to address the
jeopardy and adverse modification determinations, which they
provided to the action agencies for review. The elements of the
draft included two representatives on the BT (one from each
agency), design and implementation of unimpeded volitional
passage for anadromous fish through three additional dams within
5 years, minor changes in flow releases from the dam above the
mollusk population, and operational changes for the hydropower
and storage/delivery dams that increase flows during times of year
that would benefit the anadromous fish.
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After reviewing the draft RPA, Reclamation and the Army
Corps vigorously objected to all of the elements of the RPA except
for the changes to the dam above the mollusk population and the
inclusion of additional members of the BT. Reclamation and the
Army Corps primarily cited a lack of authority to implement the
passage structures, as well as the feasibility of designing and
implementing them within the required time frame as the basis of
their objections. Both agencies also objected to the scope and extent
of the operational changes related to the anadromous fish.
USFWS and NOAA Fisheries issued a final BiOp, including an
RPA. The final RPA retained the changes to the BT and the
mollusk dam, retained the passage structure requirements on the
three dams, but over ten years instead of five, and reduced the
extent of the other operational changes. The BiOp also included an
ITS that precisely quantified the take for all species except the
mollusk. USFWS determined that the mollusk population was too
unstable to allow any take, even of the habitat. The ITS included
specific and general RPMs, with implementing Terms and
Conditions. Reclamation and the Army Corps accepted the revised
RPA, signed the new COA, and began implementing its terms.
Almost immediately, environmental groups challenged the
BiOp in court, alleging that the document was too lenient and
provided insufficient protection to listed species. They also
challenged the BiOp on the grounds that it did not address the nonanadromous fish species. Simultaneously, hydropower and water
user groups challenged the BiOp in court, alleging that it was too
restrictive and constituted an unacceptable reduction in the
amounts of water and power available to them.
As described previously, this paper has identified the tests of
the three Circuits in which a western water decision is likely to be
challenged. The paper will next work through each court’s test, as
applied to the hypothetical operating decision and BiOp, and
predict based on those tests whether the BiOp would be found valid
by the courts.
D. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit would likely strike down the BiOp, finding
parts of it to be legally unacceptable. Recall that the five elements
likely to be of most importance to the court are: 1) an evaluation of
the value of the habitat for survival or recovery; 2) identifying what
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is properly in the environmental baseline; 3) both the long term
and the short term effects; 4) the project description must be
accurate, complete, and within the power of the action agency to
implement; and 5) the regulatory agency must have some idea of
at what point the existence of the listed species will actually be in
jeopardy. A panel of the Ninth Circuit would likely take issue with
the BiOp on elements 3 and 4.
As described in the hypothetical example, the regulatory
agencies did consider the effects of the proposed action on the
species’ recovery. So long as the BiOp contained a reasonably
discernable path through which a court can follow the agencies’
reasoning, that consideration will likely be upheld by the court.
Likewise, the agencies went to some lengths to evaluate what
was properly in the environmental baseline. The description does
not discuss to what extent the BiOp identified the pieces of the
action as discretionary or non-discretionary, and so a Ninth Circuit
panel might strike the BiOp down on that point. A BiOp that more
precisely identifies the discretionary actions while analyzing all
the actions would likely be more palatable to the court. The
document relied on extensive information about the species and
their habitats generally, as well as specific to the River system, and
included both peer reviewed science and in situ monitoring data.
Depending on the extent of the discussion of discretionary and nondiscretionary (and how well the ITS matched the discretionary
pieces) the BiOp would likely survive judicial review in the Ninth
Circuit on this element.
A Ninth Circuit panel would, however, likely not be so
generous on the third element, evaluation of short and long term
effects. As described, the BiOp analyzed the effects over the long
term, the 25 year life of the COA. It also analyzed certain actions
within the next five to ten years. It did not, however, establish any
link to the effects to the species over a generation of the species
lifetime. As the Pacific Coast Federation court put it, “[I]t is not
enough to provide water for the [fish] to survive in five years, if in
the meantime, the population has been weakened or destroyed by
inadequate water flows.”130 The BiOp here has no analysis of that
aspect, and so would likely fall before the court.

130. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
426 F.3d 1082, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005).
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The panel would likely be equally unimpressed by the BiOp’s
consideration of the fourth element, a complete, accurate, and
implementable project description. As described, the BiOp is
relying for its determination on not only uncertain actions by
Congress, over which no agency has control, but on uncertain
actions in general. The fish passage funding is entirely out of the
action agency’s ability to direct – Congress will do what Congress
will do, and for its own reasons and in its own time. While
Reclamation and/or the Army Corps could certainly request
funding for the passage structures within the normal budget cycle,
the agencies have absolutely no ability to ensure that Congress will
appropriate those dollars. In the absence of Congressional
appropriations for them, the agencies would have little to no ability
to modify the existing dams with the fish passage structures.131 In
addition, the BiOp relied on mitigation measures in the project
description that were unclear and uncertain, and which would
provide uncertain benefits. A Ninth Circuit panel would be very
likely to strike down the BiOp on that point alone.
The final element, some idea of at what point the species
actually is in jeopardy, is similar to the second, in that a panel
could find either way based on the description given. If the BiOp
has a reasonable analysis of how the agencies determined jeopardy
or no, adverse modification or no, such that the court can
reasonably discern its path, then a panel would likely uphold the
BiOp. If not, then it would get struck down. As in any case
involving review under the APA’s standard, an agency articulating
its rationale is the crucial standard, so that the agency’s path (of
reasoning) “may reasonably be discerned.”132
The panel, based on Lockyer and Flowers,133 would likely rule
in favor of the agencies on the claim that the non-anadromous fish

131. One might argue that the agencies could accomplish the structures out
of other discretionary funding. This is unlikely at best. Retrofitting a dam for
unimpeded volitional passage, or even seasonally impeded passage, is an exercise
generally costing in the tens of millions of dollars range. These are not amounts
that federal agencies just have lying around ready to hand, especially in the
current fiscal climate.
132. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citing Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys.,
Inc., 419 U.S. 281 (1974)).
133. See California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 575 F.3d 999 (9th
Cir. 2009); Defs. of Wildlife v. Flowers, 414 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2005).
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should have been included in the BiOp. So long as the action
agencies are able to articulate a rationale for why they made the
determination that the action would have no effect on the species,
the court will grant deference to the agency uphold the decision,
even if as an original matter the court might find differently.
In summary, were this hypothetical BiOp in front of a Ninth
Circuit panel, it would likely be held to be invalid, and remanded
back to the regulatory agencies. The panel would likely find that
elements 3 and 4 of the test are not met, and could find that
elements 2 and 5 are not met as well. A BiOp that did, however,
establish the link between the effects to the species over a
generation of each species lifetime, that identified what those
effects are likely to be, and whether those effects will push the
species over the brink into jeopardy would likely find more favor
with the court. Similarly, the BiOp as it stands in this hypothetical
includes actions that are not only uncertain, but are completely
outside the control of the federal agencies to implement. The BiOp
could certainly identify those uncertain actions and establish that
they are uncertain but may in fact occur, but cannot include them
as part of the action the agencies are evaluating. An analytic
method that might pass Ninth Circuit muster would be to assume
the uncertain actions will not occur, and then analyze those actions
that have specific commitments and make a determination of
jeopardy or not based on that framework. The agencies could then
include an analysis of what the effects of the other, uncertain,
actions would be, so that if one or more does occur the effects are
included in the consultation and reinitiation134 is not necessary.
Strategically, the agencies, by knowing what challenges they
will face before a Ninth Circuit panel, could more carefully craft
the BiOp to match the test. Alternatively, challengers of the BiOp
could use that same knowledge to craft arguments around the
weaknesses of the BiOp in relation to the test. The strategy varies

134. Reinitiation of consultation under section 7 is required when a) the
amount or extent of incidental take has been exceeded; b) new information reveals
effects of the action on listed species or critical habitat in a manner or to an extent
not previously considered; c) the federal action is modified in a manner that
causes an effect to a listed species or critical habitat that was not previously
considered; or d) a new species is listed or critical habitat is designated that may
be affected by the federal action. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (2016). A more in-depth
discussion of reinitiation triggers is not within the scope of this article.
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(preserve the BiOp versus strike it down), but the tactics of identify
the test and apply the elements remain the same. Identifying the
elements (the difficulties, dangers, and distances) and applying
them on the formation of the country (the court) most skillfully will
be what carries the day on the battlefield.
E. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit would also likely strike down the BiOp,
finding parts of it to be legally unacceptable. Recall that the three
elements likely to be of most importance to the court are: 1) an
evaluation of the effects of the proposed action on the species
recovery; 2) the use of valid, peer-reviewed scientific data; and 3) a
definite commitment to implementing each piece of the proposed
action before evaluating it.
The first element is nearly identical to the Ninth Circuit’s
element, and would likely be upheld in the Tenth Circuit for the
same reasons it would in the Ninth.
The second element is also likely to be upheld. The agencies
relied on a great deal of scientific peer-reviewed information in
developing the BiOp, in addition to monitoring data provided by
the agencies from within the River system. While challengers to
the BiOp may (and likely will) have their own experts, with the
administrative record here, the court is unlikely to take sides in a
“duel of experts.” The court is more likely to allow the regulatory
agency to “rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified
experts” than to insert itself into the duel, even if the court might
find another view more persuasive.135
The third element of the Tenth Circuit’s test is nearly identical
to the Ninth Circuit’s fourth element, and would likely be found
invalid for the same reasons as described above.
The panel would likely uphold the determination on the nonanadromous fish, on the same basis the Ninth Circuit would.
Accordingly, a panel of the Tenth Circuit would likely rule
against the regulatory agencies, and remand the BiOp back to
them for revision.
The strategies and tactics in the Tenth Circuit will be similar
in form to those in the Ninth. Identification of the tests, and then
135. Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989).
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either construction of the BiOp around the elements, or
construction of the arguments against the BiOp on the same
elements, will improve the odds of carrying the day.
F.

The D.C. Circuit

The D.C. Circuit is, depending on one’s view, either the easiest
or the hardest in which to have a BiOp survive review. Recall that
this Circuit does not have an explicit test, relying instead solely on
the arbitrary and capricious review of the APA. Under such review,
the BiOp as described here would likely fail. The uncertainty of
relying on Congressional action, the uncertainty of the future
federal agency actions, the unquantifiable benefits offered by the
action agencies, and the general RPMs are all likely to be found
arbitrary and capricious, as they have no rational basis on which
the agencies can articulate any reliance. The federal agency would
have to hope to convince the reviewing panel that the benefits of
the uncertainties are sufficiently certain to allow a reasoned basis
for relying on them. This is not a position any court is likely to find
convincing. The BiOp would thus likely be remanded by a panel
back to the regulatory agencies for revision.
Like the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, the panel would likely
uphold the agencies’ determination for the non-anadromous fish,
and on the same basis as the other courts. The strategies and
tactics for dealing with the D.C. Circuit are similar in form to those
of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, and with similar improvement in
the chances of victory.
V. CONCLUSION
Each Circuit has a different test, whether express or not, for
deciding if a BiOp may survive judicial review. No document,
under any test, can be “bullet proof” and guaranteed to survive
judicial review. Conversely, there is no “silver bullet” under any
test that will guarantee remand of a challenged BiOp. Skilled
lawyering will still have a place, no matter what the agencies do in
their documents.
That said, the Ninth Circuit has the most explicit test, while
the D.C. Circuit appears to rely solely on the arbitrary and
capricious standard of the APA. In the author’s opinion, the Ninth
Circuit is likely to be the easiest Circuit in which to successfully
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challenge or defend a BiOp. The court’s specific elements make it
relatively simple, at least in theory, to craft a BiOp that can
successfully withstand review. Alternatively, that same list of
elements would make it equally simple for a challenger to find a
fatal weakness in the BiOp, one which can bring the document
down and sent back to the agency.
The D.C. Circuit is likely to be the hardest in which to
challenge a BiOp, as the court relies on the arbitrary and
capricious standard as its guide. Such a standard allows for
deference to the agencies, but requires them to articulate a
rationale for the decisions involved. Without that rationale, the
decision falls. With that rationale, the decision stands even if the
court would prefer a different result as an original matter.
It is tempting to close this paper with airy pronouncements of
ways to “fix” the complications of the section 7 process as it relates
to complex water management decisions. There are no such simple
fixes. The current Congress is extremely unlikely to take any
action that will untangle the skein of conflicting and confusing
requirements in a way that continues the successes of the ESA,
and the author is pessimistic about any Congressional changes
that will do better that are reasonably certain to occur. The
prospects in the courts are better, though the varying
interpretations of statute, regulation, and precedent that range
across the Circuits will continue to confuse and confound
practitioners, and provide job security for lawyers, for quite some
time to come.
The best hope lies, I think, with the agencies themselves.
While the conflicts over the use of water that drive the vast
majority of water/ESA litigation will also not be going away any
time soon, the agencies that take the lessons of the courts to heart,
and use them to build better documents, will bring some
consistency and certainty to the process. The answer is not in
clamping down and instituting more regional or Washington office
review – that way lies madness and delay.136 Instead, the agencies
that develop more training and experience on the ground and in
the field, that understand what the courts look for, that

136. The sardonic truth of the ancient statement, “I’m from the D.C. office
and I’m here to help,” remains darkly humorous to this day. To everyone not from
the D.C. office, at least.
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understand what the other agencies can and cannot do, and that
incorporate the real lessons from the courts, those agencies will be
more often upheld when the courts’ attention is brought to bear.
The stakeholder groups who so often litigate have lessons to
learn as well, but once those lessons are learned, may bear
additional benefits. Stakeholder interests are many and varied, as
many interests as there are groups, if not more. The central claim
of them all, however, is that misapplication of the ESA in the
context of water (among other environmental resource issues, of
course) has fundamentally damaged their interests. Taking them
at their word, then, groups that can help the agencies learn how to
build better documents can add their weight to making the
documents, and the decisions that underlie them, better, more
defensible, and more certain.
No one claims that the Endangered Species Act is perfect. No
one claims that it can be perfect. It can, however, be made better
in practice, and learning to calculate the difficulties, dangers, and
distances involved, and mastering the natural formation of the
country, are the necessary first steps.
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